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Abstract: Wang Guowei’s 王國維  (1887-1927) understanding of the idea of 
tragedy was inspired by two German philosophers—Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. 
It is generally held that the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer plays a 
fundamental role in Wang’s borrowing from Western philosophers. Wang 
Guowei’s Hongloumeng Pinglun 紅樓夢評論 (Commentaries on A Dream of Red 
Mansions, 1904) shows that in fact he was closer to Nietzsche than to 
Schopenhauer. This paper focuses on the article and the idea of “tragedy” in the 
context of Wang Guowei, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Although Commentaries on 
A Dream of Red Mansions was based on Schopenhauer’s idea, it is in fact 
alienated from Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the sense that it represents the double 
movement back into his own cultural sensibility—renjian qinghuai 人間情懷 
(feeling for this world). The double movement occurred in the case of using 
Nietzsche too, not as alienation, but as bringing in. Nietzsche’s “spirit of tragedy” 
was brought into Chinese culture based on Wang’s own strong initiative. Wang’s 
conscious closeness to Nietzsche is also an uncompleted mission since his 
Confucian principles are against Nietzsche’s abrupt departure from his tradition. 
This misunderstanding and misinterpretation shows well the true face of cross-
culture communication at the beginning of 20th century, especially when we 




Wang Guowei 王國維  (1887 – 1927) was a late Qing scholar who assumed a 
pioneering role in introducing Western philosophy to China.  Unlike the other of his 
contemporaries, Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873-1929), Kang Youwei 康有為（1858-
1927）and Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854-1921), who were interested in introducing Western 
politics, social science, and other practical revolutions for the reestablishment of 
China as a great power, Wang Guowei was the first to celebrate and earnestly 
introduce great wisdom — Western philosophy, aesthetics and literature. As renewed 
concern with traditional culture emerged powerfully in the 1990s, and discussions of 
modernity became prominent, Wang has been cited as the founder of Chinese ideas 
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about philosophical and literary-aesthetic modernity.
2
 Wang Guowei is directly 
relevant to the pioneering of a Chinese cultural modernity. Therefore, interpreting his 
work is essential to achieve a better grasp of the problems that accompany the 
emergence of Chinese modernity. Wang Guowei’s understanding of the idea of 
“tragedy” exemplifies the case. 
Wang Guowei was the first scholar who introduced the aesthetic idea of 
“tragedy” into Chinese academic world. His understanding of “tragedy” was mainly 
inspired by two German philosophers, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. It is generally 
held that the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer plays a fundamental role in 
Wang’s borrowing from Western philosophy. Wang Guowei’s essay Hongloumeng 
Pinglun 紅樓夢評論 (Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions, 1904) shows that 
in fact he was closer to Nietzsche than to Schopenhauer and it represents Wang’s 
double movement back into his own cultural sensibility. This paper focuses on the art 
of “tragedy” in the context of Wang Guowei, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and tries to 
reveal the true face of cross-culture communication at the beginning of 20th century, 
especially when we consider the development of Chinese aesthetic modernity.  
The proposition of this paper is that there is a specifically Chinese sensibility that 
is crucial for understanding Wang’s use of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, a sensibility 
that has been ignored by those who later sought to reconstruct and evaluate his earlier 
studies.   I intend to argue that Wang Guowei’s entire philosophical and aesthetic 
thinking was developed upon a deep “feeling for this world”.  The phrase “feeling for 
this world” renjian qinghuai (人間情懷) is borrowed from traditional Chinese culture 
to describe the Chinese sensibility that played an important role in Wang’s 
appropriation and departure from Schopenhauer.  It would be another project in itself 
to talk adequately about the Chinese sensibility of renjian qinghuai, but for the 
limited scope of our topic, a casual and general definition of the phrase will suffice.  
One of the most persistent ideas in Chinese philosophy is that since there is no 
transcendent divinity in Chinese culture comparable to the Western transcendent spirit, 
the Chinese concerns for “life” are expressed and embodied in “the proper way of 
human beings” (rendao 人道) and concrete, familiar things in this world (renshi 人
事).  Concepts such as dao and tian in Chinese philosophy cannot be interpreted in 
the same way as the concepts of Idea, God, Will, and other absolute principles often 
found in Western philosophy.  Chinese philosophy concerns itself with “the proper 
way of human beings” even more than “the way of tian”; or, to put it another way, 
“the way of tian” (tiandao 天道) is actually the same as “the proper way of human 
beings,” and is not something above and beyond rendao.   
Wang Guowei points out this difference between Chinese philosophy and 
Western philosophy in an article written in 1906: 
“Although Zhongyong 中庸 is a philosophy which raises ‘Cheng’ (誠) [integrity, 
sincerity] as the essence of cosmos and life, it is still different from modern Western 
philosophy. ‘Cheng’ as a concept is not only different from Fichte’s ‘Ego,’ 
                                                             
2 See Wen Rumin (1993); Liu Xuan (1996); Liu Xiaofeng (1998); Zhang Hui (1999), Peng 
Feng (2009). 




Journal of East-West Thought 
 
Schelling’s ‘Absolute,’ Hegel’s ‘Idea,’ Schopenhauer’s ‘Will,’ and Harmann’s 
‘Unconscious,’ but it is also different in interpretation and explanation. I don’t think 
that borrowing the concepts of modern Western philosophy to interpret ancient 
Chinese philosophy is the right way to approach our ancient philosophy in its own 
terms. Our ancient scholars were not so systematic in their writing; in one passage, 
they can freely talk about both tiandao and renshi, the same as for a whole chapter, 
and they feel free to use one word to express all the different meanings, and to use 
one concept to discuss both Tian and human beings (“Comments on Gu Tangsheng’s 
English Translation of Zhongyong”, Shu Gu Tangsheng Yingyi Zhongyonghou, 《書
辜氏湯生英譯中庸后》), 1906).” 
The emphasis on human affairs to which Wang refers can also be found in a well-
known passage from the Analects: 
 
Chi-lu [Jilu] asked about serving the gods and the spirits of the dead, but the Master 
replied, “If you are not yet able to serve other people, how can you serve the spirits of the 
dead?” He then asked about death, but the Master replied, “If you do not yet understand 




Philosophically, some clues can be found in Roger Ames and David Hall’s works on 
Chinese philosophy, where they describe the essential characteristics of Chinese 
sensibility in both Confucian and in Daoist terms.  In their translation of the 
Zhongyong, Ames and Hall choose “focusing the familiar affairs of the day” to 
describe one of the central Confucian ideas, zhongyong中庸.  Zhongyong, as they 
interpret it, “emphasizes the profoundly transformative effect that consummate human 
beings have on the world around them.”4  It expresses the concept of “ritualizing the 
human experience and enchanting the common, the routine, the concrete, and 
immediate. . . .  Ritualizing the human experience requires both an appreciation of 
persistent life forms, and the full exercise of our imagination in authorizing them for 
our own time and place.”5  The ideal exemplary human beings who “feel for this 
world” are sages like Confucius who act “through their creative participation in the 
transforming and nourishing activities of the world….  The cultivated moral, aesthetic, 
and religious sensibilities that define the flourishing community inspired by and fully 
integrated into the rhythms of the natural environment, have an elevating spiritual 
effect that adds significance and value to the world.” 6   In their philosophical 
translation of the Dao De Jing (2004), Ames and Hall opt for the subtitle Making This 
Life Significant “to capture the defining purpose of the text:  bringing into focus and 
sustaining a productive disposition that allows for the fullest appreciation of those 
specific things and events that constitute one’s field of experience.”7   
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“Focusing on the familiar things in this world” or “feeling for this world” are 
socially (communally) centered concepts; they express a concern for one’s concrete, 
immediate life instead of postulating some distant, transcendent, individual goal.  
Such a way of thinking is most acceptable to Chinese intellectuals, and, as such, 
influenced Wang’s aesthetic ideas immensely. Yu Yingshi, in his book Scholar-
Official and Chinese culture (Shi yu Zhongguo Wenhua, 《士與中國文化》 ) 
describes intellectuals in Chinese culture who traditionally play the role of “the 
conscience of society”:  “...The Confucian Shi who aims at Dao (the Way) 
demonstrates that that Shi is the protector of basic social value…  [This ideal] had a 
profound influence on later scholar-officials, and its spiritual power was even more 
evident when the community had suffered from a time in which the Dao was lost.”8   
This reminds us of the words by Wang’s best friend, the historian Chen Yinke (1890
－1969), who concludes in the preface to his elegiac words to Wang Guowei’s death 
by suicide (Wang Guantang Xiansheng Wanci bing xu,《王國維先生挽詞並序》): 
“Whenever a culture is in decline, the person who has received benefits from this 
culture will necessarily suffer.  The more a person embodies this culture, the deeper 
will be his suffering….  How can a man who personifies the very spirit of this culture 
not meet the same fate and come to an end along with it?”9  
 In Wang’s works, renjian 人間  (“this world” or “human world”) appears 
repeatedly, and it is arguably the central concept of his philosophical thought.  Two of 
his poetry collections are titled Renjian ci （《人間詞》, Poems of “This World” 
Vol. I, 1904-1906, and Poems of “This World” Vol. II, 1906-1907, and another of his 
landmark theoretical works is entitled “Renjian cihua” (《人間詞話》), The Poetry 
of “This World,” 1908.   A statistical study reveals that in his 115 poems in Poems of 
This World, he uses the exact term renjian (“this human world”) 39 times; and that 
does not include other frequently used words bearing similarity through meaning and 
use to renjian人間 such as rensheng (人生, human life) and shaohua (韶華, glorious 
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time in human life). His close friends even called him “Mr. This World” (人間先生, 
renjian xiansheng). 
Most contemporary scholars argue that “this world” in Wang’s works is always 
the “tragic world” of the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer, and hence Poems 
of This World is a “vivid practice of Schopenhauer’s pessimism.” 10   However, 
compared to Wang’s Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions, the appearance of 
the collection Poems of This World was much later than Wang’s time of addiction to 
Schopenhauer’s thinking. In fact, it is easy to find numerous examples in his Poems of 
This World that challenge the commonly held opinion that the main thrust of Wang’s 
aesthetic lies in sadness and hopelessness.  Poems of This World is rather a proof of 
love, an enthusiasm for this world, and reveals the heart of his cultural sensibility.11 
 I will use Wang’s Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions and the idea of 
“tragedy” as an example to show the connections and differences between Wang 
Guowei, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The paper will be divided into two parts:  in 
Part I, I will discuss how the Chinese sensibility renjian qinghuai played an important 
role in Wang’s “borrowing” from Schopenhauer, which is quite contrary to the 
common understanding that Wang was a devoted follower of Schopenhauer’s 
“pessimistic” side.  In Part II, I will make a further step, demonstrating Wang’s use of 
Nietzsche.   
 
I: Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions and Schopenhauer 
 
A Dream of Red Mansions (Houloumeng，《紅樓夢》) was written in the 18th 
century and since then has received endless attention in the history of Chinese 
literature. It is said that it took the author Cao Xueqin (1715-1763) more than ten 
years to polish and repolish it, but the novel was still unfinished when he died in 
1763. The novel describes in detail the fall of two large powerful families, mainly 
because of disfavor with the Emperor. The main character Baoyu (Precious Jade) is in 
love with Daiyu -- Baoyu’s most sentimental, talented, emotional, jealously sick 
cousin.  But Baoyu is predestined in this life to marry another cousin, Xue Baochai. 
At the end, after his true love dies, Baoyu follows a Daoist sage and departs 
untraceably. The love triangle of Baoyu, Daiyu, and Xue Baochai, against the 
background of the family's decline, is at the heart of this best-known novel. 
Wang Guowei’s Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions has been viewed 
not only as a landmark in modern Chinese literary theory, but also as representative of 
Schopenhauer’s influence on Wang Guowei in his philosophical and aesthetic theory.  
The well-known authority on Wang Guowei, Ye Jiaying, in her important book Wang 
Guowei and His Literary Theory(Wang Guowei Jiqi Wenxue Piping, 《王國維及其
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文學批評》), names three contributions of Wang’s Critique of the Dream of Red 
Chamber to the history of Chinese literary theory:  
 
1. It was the first work to criticize literature from a philosophical and aesthetic 
perspective. 
2. Going beyond traditional literary theory, Wang’s study of The Dream of the 
Red Chamber was the first systematic critical work in the history of Chinese 
literary theory. 
3. It brought changes and a new rectification to the prevailing “textual exegesis” 
of contemporary literary criticism, especially with regard to studies of The 
Dream of the Red Chamber.  Most late-Qing Red Chamber scholars were 
intrigued by questions of authorship, edition, background, and so forth.  They 
rarely looked at the aesthetic value of the work itself.  Wang introduced an 
aesthetic eye to grasp the spirit and value of the work.12  
 
While Ye Jiaying highly praises Wang’s breakthrough of interpreting the work 
through a philosophical perspective, she criticizes Wang for making the work serve 
his own philosophical aim, namely Schopenhauer’s pessimism, instead of letting 
philosophical ideas come naturally from the work itself.  
Given the problems inherent in any attempt to celebrate the breakthrough of 
Wang’s Critique in Chinese literary history, most interpretations of Wang Guowei’s 
work seem to indicate that the “first meaning” (di yi yi, 第一義) of this work 
unquestionably was Schopenhauer’s pessimism; hence, concentrated discussions and 
debates have focused primarily on whether or not it was a successful application of 
Schopenhauer’s thought.  
Before exploring further the problematic in this common interpretation, I want to 
provide some explanation as to why a “philosophical interpretation” was viewed as a 
great achievement in Chinese thinking.  As I mentioned above, Wang’s encounter 
with and introduction to Western philosophy is different (even unique) from that of 
his contemporaries.  “The (haunting) problem of the universe and human life” drives 
him to search for answers in Western philosophy (“The First Author’s Note on 
Reaching Thirty Years of Age,” Sanshi Zixu I, 《三十自序（一）》, 1907).  In 
Wang’s eyes, Western philosophy is the symbol of pure metaphysics — it lays out the 
very spirit and value of human beings.  In his works, he repeatedly praises “great 
metaphysics, sublime ethics and pure aesthetics” and disdains materialist thinking.  
He cannot endorse the doctrine of Herbert Spencer or Darwinism, the merits of 
technology, nor the Chinese “worldliness” — he even excoriates them:  they all 
reduce philosophy to a mere tool for living (either to contend for hegemony or for 
animal-like survival), rather than seeing in it the aim of life.  Wang Guowei’s 
commentators believe that with him, the pure pursuit for human spirit and the 
aesthetics of disinterest, as opposed to the practical use of literature, appeared for the 
first time in his aesthetic theory:  only with Wang Guowei did Chinese intellectuals 
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begin to realize that literature had another function — that is, a philosophical meaning 
— to open our eyes to the truth of human life. 
According to Wang Guowei, great western thinking could be united with great 
Chinese thinking, and the same goes for great literature; that is the value of merging 
the A Dream of Red Mansions with Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Schopenhauer did 
indeed open avenues for Wang to look at Chinese literature, his culture, and the world 
in many different ways; and these different ways actually allowed him to see his own 
culture in distinctively Chinese ways:  to see another is to learn to see oneself, to look 
through the lens of another philosophical orientation is to refract light upon one’s own, 
and to seek outward is to move inward.   As a scholar who aimed to project his own 
idealization of traditional Chinese culture, Wang’s “feeling for this world” (renjian 
qinghuai) played a crucial role in his reading and appropriation of Schopenhauer.  
 If we look carefully at Wang’s Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions, we 
find that what was viewed as a Chinese practical application of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophical theory was actually a double movement of application (action) and 
reaction --- both for and against Schopenhauer --- as well as a sort of traditional 
Chinese thinking juxtaposed with Western thinking.   
The obvious and most conscious way of approaching Wang’s reading of 
Schopenhauer and other Western thinkers is to view him as being “against” the 
“happy end tendency” in Chinese literature, which makes him define A Dream of Red 
Mansions as a unique work in the history of Chinese literature —“a Tragedy from the 
very beginning to the end.”   A latent, and even unconscious, way is to view him as 
being “against” Schopenhauer’s pessimism even though Wang himself did not clearly 
realize this turn in his encounter with Schopenhauer.  It is through this latter approach 
that we can begin to value Wang’s experience of Schopenhauer and how he chooses 
to borrow from him, in what ways he is led to borrow, and how he refracts this 
understanding back to understanding and promoting his own cultural-aesthetic 
sensibility. So, Wang’s contribution to Chinese aesthetic modernity is not simply a 
break with the past, but is also a continuity, although it is a continuity with a fresh 
face. 
  
1. The Third Kind of “Tragedy”: Wang’s Departure from Schopenhauer 
 
Although Wang’s Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions was inspired by 
Schopenhauer’s thought, a fact that Wang acknowledges, Commentaries on A Dream 
of Red Mansions is in fact alienated from Schopenhauer’s philosophy in that it 
symbolizes the double movement back into his own cultural aesthetic way of being in 
the world. In the Author’s Preface to the Jing’an Collection (Jing’an Wenji《靜安文
集》) --- Jing’an is one of Wang’s style names --- Wang recants, “The article 
Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions I wrote last summer was based on 
Schopenhauer’s theory; however, I shot a big question at him in the fourth chapter:   
 
I realized that Schopenhauer’s doctrine originated partly from his subjective 
experience and therefore bears no relationship to objective knowledge.  I actually 
argued this in detail in another article, ‘Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’” (Shubeihua 
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and Nicai, 《叔本華和尼采》, which was written later in the same year that he 
wrote his Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions, 1904). 
 
And this is surely the case.  In Wang’s first three chapters — “A Survey of Human 
Life and Art,” “The Spirit of A Dream of Red Mansions,” and “The Aesthetic Value 
of A Dream of Red Mansions” — he sufficiently shows Schopenhauer’s influence.  
Wang uses Yu (欲, desire or as it was translated, “Will”) to describe the nature of life.  
He even connects this Yu with Baoyu’s name (precious jade), since 玉 , jade in 
Chinese, is a homophone of 欲 desire.  Wang writes:   
 
The desire (or will) to live exists before human beings.  Human life is only the 
discovery of the will to live.  Baoyu … desires to be in this suffering world…  His 
fatal decision [to re-enter the human world is the basis of] his 19-year destiny and 
this 120-chapter story… (Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions) 
 
This endless desire for daily life is the exact reason that life is a life of suffering.  
Also, like Schopenhauer, he believes art and the aesthetic perception can have the 
effect of giving us a short-lived emancipation from painful daily life.  Wang considers 
tragedy the highest of all written forms of art, and the aesthetic value of A Dream of 
Red Mansions lies in its spirit of tragedy, which makes this work distinguishable from, 
and opposed to, the usual “happy endings” of Chinese literature.  In this spirit, Wang 
claims that Dream of the Red Chamber is a “tragedy of tragedies” and that this makes 
it one of the world’s classic masterpieces. According to Wang, the aesthetic value of 
A Dream of Red Mansions lies in its tragic character which, according to Aristotle's 
definition in his Poetics, has the “cathartic” function on the human spirit which is the 
aim of Ethics.  He explains, “That is also the reason why Schopenhauer puts poetry 
on the top of all the literary arts and defines tragedy as the highest art form” 
(Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions).  
Schopenhauer elaborates upon Aristotle’s understanding of the effect of tragedy.  
He distinguishes three types of tragic representation:  
 
1) “the extraordinary wickedness of a character . . . who becomes the author of the 
misfortune” 
2) “blind fate—i.e., chance and error”  
3) “characters…. [who] are so situated with regard to each other that their position 
forces them, knowingly and with their eyes open, to do each other the greatest 
injury, without any one of them being entirely in the wrong.”13  
 
Schopenhauer regarded the last kind of tragedy as the most profound, since it shows 
the reader that disaster can, and often does, arise out of the ordinary circumstances of 
everyday life.14 Wang shares Schopenhauer’s emphasis on the third kind of tragedy, 
                                                             
13 Arthur Schopenhauer (1969), Vol: 254. 
14 Ibid. 
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but his understanding was very different from Schopenhauer’s. In Schopenhauer’s 
case, it seems because the third form of tragedy is compared to 
 
 …the other two,… it shows us that the greatest misfortune…arises easily and 
spontaneously out of the actions and characters of men…and in this way it is 
brought terribly near to us.… [It] shows us those powers that destroy happiness and 
life, and in such a way that the path to them is at every moment opens even to us. 
…Then, shuddering, we feel ourselves already in the midst of hell.15 
 
For Schopenhauer, just because the third form of tragedy happens so unexpectedly, 
inevitably, at any moment, at any time, the sufferer is threatened and shocked enough 
to observe “the complete knowledge of the real nature of the world, acting as a 
quieter of the will, producing resignation, the giving up not merely of life, but of the 
whole will-to-live itself.”16 
Wang Guowei departs from Schopenhauer exactly here. For Schopenhauer, the 
inevitable, ordinary tragedy which befalls ordinary people produces the “denial of the 
will to live.”  Wang acknowledges the “ordinary, universal” character of the third kind 
of tragedy (for him, it is the very essence of “tragedy”), yet, he adamantly disagrees 
with Schopenhauer when it comes to how to understand the meaning of this kind of 
tragedy. He argues, 
 
Without experiencing the suffering facts of this world how is one to talk about 
denial of the will-to-live?  Suffering has no value in itself at all; it should be the 
way to reach the denial of the will-to-live. A person who is living in suffering and 
always lamenting suffering, but has no courage for release, will arrive nowhere, 
neither in heaven nor in hell. (Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions) 
 
He questions, “Is denial of the will to live really possible?” His concern is ethical.  
Is denial of the will-to-live really the highest ideal of ethics? No, since it is opposed to 
our basic social virtue. But why is this so? If we can look at our world in a full way, 
we will realize that the existence of our world is due to the sins of our ancestors. We 
were also created for it. Therefore, we, as the offspring of our ancestors, bear the 
responsibility to atone for their crime and attain salvation. (Commentaries on A 
Dream of Red Mansions) So he talks about “responsibility.” 
 
2. The Impossibility of Jietuo (Denial of the Will-to-Live) 
 
When we reach Chapter 4 (“The Ethical Value of A Dream of Red Mansions”) of 
Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions, we can see that Wang Guowei seems to 
overthrow his former reliance on Schopenhauer. We see this in his use of the central 
concept jietuo (解脫, emancipation, transcendence, and the “denial of the Will-to-
Live”). In this concept of jietuo lies Wang Guowei’s big question for Schopenhauer. 
                                                             
15 Ibid, 255. 
16 Ibid, 253. 
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Wang argues that “Schopenhauer only talks about the individual Denial of the 
Will-to-Live, instead of the whole world which is opposed to his doctrine of ‘the 
world as will’.” That is exactly what he means when he says that Schopenhauer “only 
cites some words from the Bible and classical works, but has no theoretical 
foundation” (Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions). What the “theoretical 
foundation” means for him is that since Schopenhauer thinks that an individual will is 
unified with the will of the universe as a whole, one is a part of the universe like 
everything else.  One person, as a microcosmos, is a holographic being of the 
Universe, just like the sea and all the bubbles of the waves that are interdependent 
with each other.  The Will should be a question of “being one with all things.”  As 
such, individual transcendence cannot happen until all flesh is released. He argues, “I 
won’t be a Buddha until all flesh is released.” But that has never actually happened. 
And why so? — The transcendence of Buddha cannot occur without the 
transcendence of all flesh and body. All we need to do is to look at this world and we 
soon discover it is still a painful world for all fleshly humans, even after Buddha’s 
Nirvana, Christ’s Passion, and so forth.  How can it be celebrated for that? 
Since common people are still suffering in this world, how can it be said that 
Buddha and Christ are transcendent?  Therefore, an individual jietuo (denial of the 
will to live) is fundamentally impossible since the will of the universe and the myriad 
things amount to the will of me. In other words, a human being as a member of a 
community should be responsible for the suffering reality of those in the community 
and bear the responsibility to change the situation. Jietuo (Emancipation) in Wang 
Guowei’s understanding is not getting rid of reality, but is found in facing it, and 
changing it:  “The emancipation of the microcosmos (human being) should be within 
the macrocosmos (the world)” (Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions). 
Wang’s community-centered mind finds the expression of individuality in 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine highly problematic since he identifies Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine “World as Will” with the concept of the “oneness of tian and human beings” 
(tianren heyi天人合一) or the “oneness of all things” (wanwu yiti 萬物一體). More 
interestingly, he cites a whole passage in World as Will and Representation that, to 
his mind, shows how Schopenhauer realizes the problem and tries to rectify the 
conflict in his doctrine:  
 
Voluntary and complete chastity is the first step in asceticism or the denial of the 
will-to-live. It thereby denies the affirmation of the will, which goes beyond the 
individual life, and thus announces that the will, whose phenomenon is the body, 
ceases with the life of this body. Nature, always true and naïve, asserts that, if this 
maxim became universal, the human race would die out; and after what was said in 
the second book about the connexion of all phenomena of will, I think I can assume 
that, with the highest phenomenon of will, the weaker reflection of it, namely, the 
animal world, would also be abolished, just as the half-shades vanish with the full 
light of day. With the complete abolition of knowledge the rest of the world would 
of itself also vanish into nothing, for there can be no object without a subject. Here 
I would like to refer to a passage in the Veda where it says: “As in this world 
hungry children press round their mother, so do all beings await the holy oblation”. 
Sacrifice signifies resignation generally, and the rest of nature has to expect its 
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salvation from man who is at the same time priest and sacrifice. In fact, it is worth 
mentioning as extremely remarkable that this thought has also been expressed by 
the admirable and immeasurably profound Angelus Silesius in the little poem 
entitled “Man brings all to God”; it runs: 
“Man! All love you; great is the throng around you: All flock to you that they may 
attain to God.”  
 
But an even greater mystic, Meister Eckhart, says wholly in the sense here discussed: 
“I confirm this with Christ, for he says: ‘I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw 
all things [men] unto me’ (John xii, 32).” So shall the good man draw all things up to 
God, to the source whence they first came. The masters certify to us that all creatures 
are made for the sake of man. This is proved in all creatures by the fact that one 
creature makes use of another; the ox makes use of the grass, the fish of the water, the 
bird of the air, the animals of the forest. Thus all creatures come to the profit of the 
good man. A good man bears to God one creature in the others.” He means that 
because, in and with himself, man also saves the animals, he makes use of them in 
this life. It seems to me indeed that that difficult passage in the Bible, Rom. Viii, 21-
24, is to be interpreted in this sense. 
 Even in Buddhism there is no lack of expressions of this matter; for example, 
when the Buddha, while still a Bodhisattva, has his horse saddled for the last time, for 
the flight from his father’s house into the wilderness, he says to the horse in verse: 
“Long have you existed in life and in death, but now you shall cease to carry and to 
draw. Bear me away from here just this once, O Kantakana, and when I have attained 
the Law (have become Buddha), I shall not forget you.17  
This passage may reveal Wang’s own wishful “cultural misreading.”  Wang 
interpreted Meister Eckhart’s statement, “the good man draws all things up to God, to 
the source whence they first came,” in this fashion:  God as a member of the whole 
realizes that the whole world should be released instead of just Himself.  In fact, 
Wang misunderstood Schopenhauer’s aristocratism (or elitism) of Will with 
knowledge:  Schopenhauer separates the world as Will and Representation and views 
Will as the essence of human being and the whole world, but he simply could not rise 
above the concept of transcendence — represented by the dualism of the human and 
the divine.  He emphasizes Will in life, but he concerns himself more with the 
objectivity of will — Will with knowledge --- and only geniuses could objectify their 
will and have the knowledge and power to deny the will-to-live: 
 
The opposite of this, the denial of the will-to-live, shows itself when willing ends 
with that knowledge, since the particular phenomena known then no longer act as 
motives of willing, but the whole knowledge of the inner nature of the world that 
mirrors the will, knowledge that has grown up through apprehension of the Ideas, 
becomes the quieter of the will, and thus the will freely abolishes itself.18 
 
                                                             
17 Ibid, 380-1. 
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An ascetic as “the highest phenomena of will, the weaker reflection of it, namely the 
animal world, would also be abolished, just as the half-shades vanish with the full 
light of day.”19  Therefore, the statement “I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw 
all things [men] unto me” (John xii, 32) and “Thus all creatures come to the profit of 
the good man; a good man bears to God one creature in the others,” are expressions 
that the elitist exemplifying Will with knowledge does a favor to the crowd (the 
common people).  Wang doesn’t really care about the holy existence of God.  Even 
Buddha and Christ are in his description not meant to be more than sages such as 
Confucius --- sages who are always with the common people and who are the 
common people, while never existing outside of this world.   
Schopenhauer’s idea of denial of the will-to-live expresses the individual hero’s 
disdain and a break from his world: 
 
If we compare life to a circular path of red-hot coals having a few cool places, a 
path that we have to run over incessantly, then the man entangled in delusion is 
comforted by the cool place on which he is just now standing, or which he sees 
through the principium individuationis, and recognizes the true nature of things-in-
themselves, and thus the whole, is no longer susceptible of such consolation; he 
sees himself in all places simultaneously, and withdraws. His will turns about; it no 
longer affirms its own inner nature, mirrored in the phenomenon, but denies it… he 
ceases to will anything, guards against attaching his will to anything, tries to 
establish firmly in himself the greatest indifference to all things.20  
 
In Wang Guowei’s mind, Schopenhauer’s World as Will turns into “life should be 
equally treated,” which we probably can find reminiscent of Zhuangzi’s lines in the 
Qi Wu Lun (On the Equality of Things). Wang realizes that:  
 
His [Schopenhauer’s] idea of the universal beneficence (bo’ai 博愛) is not about 
loving this world, but only about love in his own world.  His idea to “die out” 
(Jietuo) is not about wanting to be dead, but is an expression of his dissatisfaction 
with this world. While Buddha says “heaven and earth, worship me,” 
Schopenhauer would say, “the only possibility for me to be happy is that heaven 
and earth only exist for me. (“Schopenhauer and Nietzsche”) 
 
Before this passage, Wang also cites Friedrich Paulsen’s (1846-1908) discussion of 
Schopenhauer’s personal relation to the morality of his system: 
 
It has often been pointed out that there is no harmony between Schopenhauer’s 
system and his life. The system recommends renunciation of the world and 
negation of the will-to-live; his life shows nothing of the kind; he does not lead the 
life of an ascetic saint but of an Epicurean… In his system he praises compassion; 
but he seems to have been rather devoid of this feeling himself. No one ever 
pursued his literary opponents more unmercifully than did Schopenhauer…. During 
his entire life he was as careful as he was successful in guarding against sharing 
                                                             
19 Ibid, 380. 
20 Ibid, 380. 
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other’s losses and sufferings.…  And he was helpless against them; he often says so 
himself: it is a curious but undoubted fact that the clearest knowledge of the 
perverseness of the will can produce no change in it. This enables us to understand 
his ethical system: it is the confession of his failings and sins.21  
 
Wang concludes that “Paulsen’s opinion of Schopenhauer is not wrong, but he does 
not realize that it is not only because of his practical knowledge, but also his 
subjective will.”  Wang realizes that Schopenhauer’s truth is not about the universe 
and this world, but only about himself. Wang’s Confucian heart could never accept a 
modern-individual-hero-Schopenhauer:  “He looked at himself as Atlas who supports 
the earth and Brahma who nurtures the universe” (“Schopenhauer and Nietzsche”, 
1904). Here I would cite what he says in Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions 
again,  
 
In conclusion, whether jietuo (denial of the will-to-live) should be the highest ideal 
of ethics actually is linked to whether there is a possibility of denial of the will-to-
live…  Now, given the impossibility of jietuo (denial of the will-to-live), how can 
there exist the possibility of this ideal of ethics? One doctrine that is opposed to this 
doctrine of lifeless-ism (wusheng zhuyi 無生主義) is live-life-ism (shengsheng 
zhuyi 生生主義). This world is finite, but human life is infinite.  Put the infinite 
human life in the finite world, and as a consequence, some cannot get their right to 
live.  However, the ideal of live-life-ism will not permit even a single individual 
who cannot get his right to be in this world.  Therefore, from the ideal of the live-
life-ism, if we want to maximize the quantity of the life in this world, we should 
minimize the purview of individual.  The so-called maximum of the happiness and 
benefits for the most is only a dream of ethics… however, without this dream, our 
world will be arranged by the law of the jungle.  What is ethics for?  Our human 
life is such a suffering life, anybody of courage and uprightness would eagerly 
request release.  Though we cannot find it in practical life, we should strive for it in 
art. 
 
The late philosopher Feng Youlan (1895-1990) insightfully points out that “Although 
Wang Guowei has big questions about Schopenhauer’s philosophy, he does not 
question the Dream of Red Chamber.  He even gives higher praise to A Dream of Red 
Mansions, since he thinks of it as an artistic creation.  A Dream of Red Mansions is 
most important and meaningful for our contemporary human world.”22  
 
II:  Wang Guowei and Nietzsche 
         
Wang’s borrowing from Nietzsche is quite different from his use of Schopenhauer. 
The Chinese collective unconsciousness of “focusing on this world” was a driving 
force in Wang Guowei’s deviation from the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer.  
However, he consciously paid tribute to Nietzsche’s “spirit-of tragedy” and hoped to 
                                                             
21 Friedrich Paulsen, 1913, 210-213. 
22 Feng Youlan (1962), vol. II, 542. 
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use it to rectify one of China’s aesthetic tendencies --- “eternal optimism” --- 
especially in an era of national decadence.  Wang’s Commentaries on A Dream of 
Red Mansions shows that he was closer to Nietzsche than to Schopenhauer.  Although 
Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions was based on Schopenhauer’s ideas, it is 
in fact alienated from Schopenhauer’s philosophy in that it represents the double 
movement back into his own cultural aesthetic way of being in the world.  The double 
movement occurred in the case of using Nietzsche too, not as alienation, but as 
bringing in.  Nietzsche’s “spirit of tragedy” was brought into Chinese culture based 
on his own strong initiative. 
 
I. The Spirit of Tragedy: Wang’s appropriation of Nietzsche 
 
 Wang Guowei openly admitted that his critique of the A Dream of Red Mansions was 
influenced by Schopenhauer’s ideas, yet he also mentioned his discomfort with 
Schopenhauer, especially with his Denial of the Will to Live.  He developed this idea 
in his article on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. 
In Part I, I explained that Wang’s questions to Schopenhauer in theory actually 
unconsciously showed that his “feeling for this world” was dominant in his 
understanding.  Here I will use some examples he gave in his article to show what 
Wang Guowei values most as the summit of poetic art --- tragedy.  
In his article Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions, Wang differentiates 
Baoyu’s jietuo (解脫, “emancipation, transcendence, and the denial of the Will-to-
Live”) from the escapism of Xichun and Zijuan. Baoyu ultimately followed a Daoist 
recluse and left his family. Xichun, his young cousin, who from a young age wanted 
to be a nun, eventually became a nun. And Zijuan, Daiyu’s maid, devoted herself to 
Buddhism after her master died. Some contemporary scholars maintain that Wang 
valued Xichun and Zijuan’s reclusion over Baoyu’s, as he called the first two 
“extraordinary” and Baoyu “ordinary.” Wang comments: 
  
Only an extraordinary individual has extraordinary wisdom and understands the 
essence of the cosmos and human life, knowing that life and suffering cannot be 
separate from each other.  Therefore they deny the Will-to-live, and are 
transcendent (Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions). 
 
Scholars have repudiated Wang’s comment since Xichun and Zijuan in Cao’s book 
are un-important characters who show no evidence of being “extraordinary” at all.  
Why would Wang put them “over” Baoyu?  From my perspective, Wang’s comments 
need to be understood in an alternative way. Xichun and Zijuan’s devotion to 
Buddhism arose from others’ suffering, without personal experience. However, what 
Wang emphasizes most is not an “extraordinary”, mysterious sudden enlightenment, 
but the experience of ordinary human life--- cast by tears and suffering. Ordinary 
people experience “life as the kiln, suffering as charcoal,” eventually “casting the 
cauldron of transcendence” (Critique of the Dream of Red Chamber). It is worth 
mentioning here, that in another article, Qu du pian (《去毒篇》, “Methods to cure the 
addiction to Opium”, 1906), Wang views the “solace” of religion as inferior to the 
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inspiration of art, because religion refers to the “future ideal,” but art is positive, 
humane and realistic. In relation to the A Dream of Red Mansions, he comments: 
 
In conclusion, the former [Xichun and Zijuan]’s Denial of the Will to Live is 
supernatural, spiritual, the latter [Boayu]’s natural, humane; the former’s religious, 
the latter’s artistic; the former’s peaceful, the latter’s tragic, magnificent, hence 
literary, poetic and novelistic.  Therefore the leading personae in this novel are not 
Xichun and Zijuan, but Baoyu (Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions). 
 
Wang Guowei emphasizes “self-offense, self-punishment, self-confession, self-
transcendence.” Only an ordinary individual and his Denial of the Will to live through 
painful self-struggle could achieve the beauty of “tragic magnificence”---that is 
exactly why he values the third tragedy most. In this regard Wang Guowei is closer to 
Nietzsche than to Schopenhauer.  For the meaning of tragedy, Nietzsche is standing 
against Schopenhauer. 
A highest state of affirmation of existence is conceived from which the highest 
degree of pain cannot be excluded: the tragic-Dionysian state.23 And,  
 
Art and nothing but art! It is the great means of making life possible, the great 
seduction to life, the great stimulant of life. Art as the only superior counterforce to 
all will to denial of life, as that which is anti-Christian, anti-Buddhist, antinihilist 
par excellence. Art as the redemption of the man of knowledge — of those who see 
the terrifying and questionable character of existence, who want to see it, the men 
of tragic knowledge.  Art as the redemption of the man of action —of those who 
not only see the terrifying and questionable character of existence but live it, want 
to live it, the tragic — warlike man, the hero.  Art as the redemption of the sufferer 
— as the way to states in which suffering is willed, transfigured, deified, where 
suffering is a form of great delight.24 
 
Both Nietzsche and Wang Guowei affirm that art/tragedy and suffering have a 
positive effect on human life.  But their difference is also obvious. While 
Schopenhauer emphasizes the denial of life, Wang Guowei emphasizes “the process” 
of the pain.  For Wang Guowei, it is stalwart “living” in the midst of pain that 
bestows meaning and value upon a human being.  Yet, his affirmation of this 
suffering life is so immersed in Confucian “feeling for this human world” that his 
affirmation is by no means a Dionysian affirmation.  Quoting Nietzsche, “How much 
truth can a spirit endure, how much truth does a spirit dare?”25  Nietzsche’s goals are 
“reversing the values” and instilling “the value of becoming.” 
Therefore, I would say that Wang consciously prefers Nietzsche’s concept of 
tragedy but stops at what he thinks is right.  Here is another example to show his 
double movement toward Nietzsche. Both Nietzsche and Wang Guowei positively 
viewed Faust as the protagonist in Goethe’s tragic drama Faust, while Schopenhauer 
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chose Gretchen as the noblest man, after a long conflict and suffering, “finally…so 
keenly, or cheerfully and willingly give up life itself.”26  Nietzsche chose the tragic 
Faust, for he “represents the culmination of the theoretical optimism which begins 
with Socrates and which must end in frustration because of its failure to recognize its 
own limits.”27 But for Wang Guowei, in comparing the tragic protagonist, Faust, to 
Baoyu, the tragic protagonist of A Dream of Red Mansions, the former’s “frustration 
is still the suffering of the genius (the intellectual aristocrat), while Bao Yu’s suffering 
is the suffering of ordinary people, everybody’s suffering which exists at the root of 
human beings so deep that it requires (even) immediately rescue” (Commentaries on 
A Dream of Red Mansions). This shows Wang’s concern for ordinary people and for 
the emancipation of the masses. 
Actually, Wang Guowei understands both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer very 
well.  In “Schopenhauer and Nietzsche,” he points out that one (Schopenhauer) makes 
Denial of the Will to live as his ethical ideal, the other (Nietzsche) the opposite. 
However, Nietzsche [as Schopenhauer’s successor] thinks the will is the essence of a 
human being too, yet he questions Schopenhauer’s denial of the will to live, saying 
that denial of the will to live is itself a will…while Schopenhauer talks about “dying 
out”, Nietzsche talks about “transfer.” One wants to die out forever, the other views 
“dying out” as the tool of the übermensch. (“Schopenhauer and Nietzsche”) Wang 
concludes with some interesting metaphors: 
 
The suffering of Schopenhauer’s genius is like the daylight of a servant, his 
aesthetic aristocratism and metaphysical idea of “identity of the will” is like the 
night of a king.  Nietzsche’s case is different: he has Schopenhauer’s genius but 
doesn’t have his metaphysical belief, therefore he has the all-day servant’s day, all-
night servant’s night, awake a servant, in dream a servant. He has to overthrow all 
the values to slacken his burden. Schopenhauer consoles himself in his night life 
and wants to realize it in his day life, that is the reason that Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine is not against the (universal) normal morality, but Nietzsche unbridles his 
treachery without fear.  Because he doesn’t have any other way to console himself, 
he has to do thus (“Schopenhauer and Nietzsche”). 
 
1. The Idea of the Sublime 
 
Connected to the concept of tragedy is the idea of the sublime. In Commentaries on A 
Dream of Red Mansions, Wang introduces Schopenhauer’s idea of the sublime and he 
uses the Chinese expression “Zhuangmei 壯美（lit. Sublime beauty）” to translate 
this concept. Again, this Zhuangmei also reflects his cultural misunderstanding. In 
Schopenhauer’s conception, 
 
The feeling of the sublime arose from the fact that something positively 
unfavorable to the will becomes object of pure contemplation. This contemplation 
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is then maintained only by a constant turning away from the will and exaltation 
above its interests; and this constitutes the sublimity of the disposition.28  
… … 
The sublime character springs from the fact that the will is not excited here by 
objects certainly well calculated to excite it…His personal happiness or 
unhappiness will not violently affect him…and accordingly will conduct himself in 
this respect rather as a knower than as a sufferer.29 
 
Schopenhauer again emphasizes the unfavorable relationship, the special situation 
which results in a free and conscious transcending of the will (denial of the will to 
live), and calls this “sublime.” However, his Chinese admirer selected a scenario in A 
Dream of Red Mansions as the most “sublime” of the tragedy which shows that he is 
unable to transcend his “spirit of this world.” In this scene (chapter 96), the very sick 
Daiyu heard that Baoyu was going to marry Baochai, the news which “struck her ears 
like a clap of thunder”: 
 
Dai-yu’s heart felt like oil, soy-sauce, sugar and vinegar had all been poured into it 
at once.  She could not tell which flavour predominated, the sweet, the sour, the 
bitter or the salty… she herself turned back in the direction of the Naiad’s House.  
Her body felt as though it weighed a hundred tons, her feet were as wobbly as if 
she were walking on cotton-floss.  She could only manage one step at a time.  After 
an age, she still had not reached the bank by Drenched Blossoms Bridge. She was 
going so slowly, with her feet about to collapse beneath her, and in her giddiness 
and confusion had wandered off course and increased the distance by about a 
hundred yards.  She reached Drenched Blossoms Bridge only to start drifting back 
again along the bank in the direction she had just come from, quite unaware of 
what she was doing. 
 
Nightingale (Zijuan, Dai-yu’s maid) had by now returned with the handkerchief, 
but could not find Dai-yu anywhere.  She finally saw her, pale as snow, tottering 
along, her eyes staring straight in front of her, meandering in circles… 
 
“Why are you turning back again, Miss?” she asked softly.  “Where are you 
heading?” 
Dai-yu only heard the blurred outline of this question.  She replied:  “I want to ask 
Bao-yu something.” 
 
…Despite her apprehensions, she (Nightingale) dared not prevent the meeting, and 
helped Dai-yu into the room.  The funny thing was that Dai-yu now seemed to have 
recovered her strength.  She did not wait for Nightingale but raised the portiere 
herself, and walked into the room… He (Bao-yu), who had already lost his wits 
because of the unexpected marriage arrangement, was sitting up in the bed, and 
when she came in made no move to get up or welcome her, but remained where he 
was, staring at her and giving a series of silly laughs.  Dai-yu sat down uninvited, 
and she too began to smile and stare back at Bao-yu.  There were no greetings 
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exchanged, no courtesies, in fact no words of any kind.  They just sat there staring 
into each other’s faces and smiling like a pair of half-wits… 
 
Suddenly Dai-yu said:  “Bao-yu, why are you sick?” 
Bao-yu laughed.  “I’m sick because of Miss Lin.” 
 
Aroma (Bao-yu’s main maid) and Nightingale grew pale with fright.  They tried to 
change the subject, but their efforts only met with silence and more senseless 
smiles…  (The maids began to help Nightingale to take Dai-yu back)…  Dai-yu 
stood up at once, unassisted, still staring fixedly at Bao-yu, smiling and nodding 
her head.  
 
“Come on, Miss!” urged Nightingale. “It’s time to go home and rest.” 
 
“Of course!” exclaimed Dai-yu. “It’s time!” 
 
She turned to go. Still smiling and refusing any assistance from the maids, she 
strode out at twice her normal speed. 
 
This scene actually is very touching, showing the depth of Daiyu and Baoyu’s love 
for one another. Daiyu’s inexpressible feelings, and her strange behavior 
demonstrates the impact of the tragedy on her heart.  Baoyu was no better than Daiyu 
when he realized that he couldn’t control his own destiny, and would lose his true 
love forever…the smiles on both faces, their gazes at each other, their silly laughs, all 
the strange behavior in contrast with a normal “sad” scene, successfully shows the 
unexpressed pain of love. Theirs is a wordless communication — they are soul mates.  
This ordinary yet extraordinary human feeling for each other, leads Wang to 
comment:    
  
Scenes like these appear everywhere in the book.  How can they not touch our 
feelings?  No one who has an aesthetic sensibility won’t experience this tragic 
sense (Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions). 
 
This point is not only far away from Schopenhauer’s “pure contemplation”, but also 
has no resonance with Nietzsche either; for Nietzsche, the sublime comes from the 
danger; from the feeling of disgust of reality, from “the artistic taming of the 
horrific”, from the courage to rescue and reshape the will: 
 
Here, at this point of extreme danger for the will, art draws near as the enchantress 
who comes to rescue and heal; only she can reshape that disgust at the thought of 
the horrific or absurd aspect of life into notions with which it is possible to live: 




                                                             
30 Friedrich Nietzsche (2000), 46. 








In this paper, I have focused on Wang Guowei’s Commentaries on A Dream of Red 
Mansions and the art of “tragedy” to show the complicated features of Wang 
Guowei’s use of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.  Wang Guowei’s borrowing from 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche has its “primitive” face, that is, a Chinese sensibility, 
here specifically, “feeling for this world.”  Wang Guowei’s “feeling for this world” 
made a double movement in his borrowing from both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.  
In Schopenhauer’s case, he unconsciously departs from Schopenhauer’s idea of the 
Denial of the Will to live; but his move towards Nietzsche is also an uncompleted 
mission, since his Confucian value is opposed to Nietzsche’s abrupt departure from 
his tradition. Therefore, his borrowing from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche has its 
Chinese “brand.”  In the modern Chinese cultural context, true emancipation is 
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